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The Question of Constitutionality: How Separate are
the Powers? The Administrative and Social
Ramifications of Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco
By Kristin Ecklund*
"The definition [of marriage] is deeply rooted in the public's
understanding of what marriage is."'
"'No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against
the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it."'
2
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 2004, Superior Court Judge Richard Kramer
began sorting out the arguments of what has become one of the most
divisive issues in American political and social culture. 3 Same-sex
marriage has not only developed into one of this generation's most
hotly contested debates, but it has created both heroes and villains out
of some well-known, and not-so-well-known, American figures. In
fact, the individual most often credited for igniting this social
conflagration had gone virtually unnoticed by the media's radar until
the beginning of 2004, when he single-handedly sparked a
controversy that was to have the entire nation up in arms. San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom became the face of same-sex
. J.D. candidate, 2006, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A.
Communication Studies and Political Science, 2003, University of California, Los
Angeles. Ms. Ecklund wishes to thank her family, friends, and Professor Ogden
for their support and encouragement throughout this writing process.
1. Thomas Peele, Judge Hears Gay Marriage Arguments, San Ramon Valley
Times, Dec. 23, 2004, at Al.
2. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 512 (Cal. 2004)
(quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)).
3. Peele, supra note 1, at Al.
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marriage when he issued more than 4,000 marriage licenses to
homosexual couples in February of 2004.4
This note explores the consequences of Newsom's actions, which
are addressed by the California Supreme Court in Lockyer v. City and
County of San Francisco.5 This decision considered whether a local
executive official charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a
state statute exceeds his authority when, without a court ruling on the
constitutionality of the statute, he refuses to enforce the statute
because he has determined it to be unconstitutional.6 Part II will
provide the historical background of the case.7 Part III will analyze
the majority opinion of Justice George, as well as the concurring
opinion of Justice Moreno, and the concurring and dissenting
opinions of Justices Kennard and Werdegar. 8 Part IV will discuss the
administrative, social, and judicial impact of the case.9 Part V will
conclude the discussion of Lockyer and the separation of powers
doctrine. 10
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Precedential History
The separation of powers doctrine states that the legislative
branch enacts statutes, the executive branch enforces statutes, and the
judicial branch interprets statutes.11 Article III, section 3 of the
California constitution provides that "'[t]he powers of State
government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged
with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others
except as permitted by this constitution.' ' 12 While the California
constitution emphasizes the distinctions between the three branches
4. Id. at Al.
5. See generally Lockyer, 95 P.3d 459.
6. Id. at 462.
7. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part Ill and accompanying notes.
9. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
10. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
11. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 459.
12. Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Cal. 1996)
(quoting CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3).
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of government, California common law has demonstrated that these
branches are not fully independent of one another.' 3 For example,
the legislative and executive branches are permitted to consider
constitutional implications when "making discretionary decisions
within their authorized sphere of action .. ,,14 Nevertheless, the
established rule is that when an executive official has a ministerial
duty to adhere to a particular statute, the official has no authority to
disobey the mandate based on his own conclusions about the statute's
constitutionality.' 5  This section will trace the history of the
separation of powers doctrine as it relates to executive officials
within their "spheres of action."
Article III, section 3.5 of the California constitution prohibits
administrative agencies from declaring state laws unconstitutional in
the absence of an appellate court determination.' 6 This statute was
13. Id. The court in County of Mendicino noted how the decisions and actions
of one branch can have a substantial impact on the other two branches. Id. For
example, the judiciary determines the constitutionality of legislative and executive
actions, the legislature enacts laws that provide the rules for judicial and executive
proceedings, and the executive appoints judges and exercises veto power over the
legislature. Id. at 53. The court noted that this system of "checks and balances" is
what the separation of powers doctrine is intended to serve. Id. at 53.
14. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 463.
15. Id. (citing Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838)). In
Kendall, the Court found that the petitioner, the postmaster general, had a
ministerial duty to credit the respondents, U.S. mail carriers, with the full amount
to which they were entitled under their contracts. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 524.
Because this was a purely ministerial duty, the postmaster general had no discretion
at all. Id. The Court stated:
It was urged at the bar, that the postmaster general was alone
subject to the direction and control of the President, with respect
to the execution of the duty imposed upon him by this law, and
this right of the President is claimed, as growing out of the
obligation imposed upon him by the constitution, to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed. This is a doctrine that cannot
receive the sanction of this court. It would be vesting in the
President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its
support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a
principle, which, if carried out in its results, to all cases falling
within it, would be clothing the President with a power entirely to
control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the
administration of justice.
id. at 525.
16. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 466. Article III, section 3.5 states that:
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proposed by the Legislature, and it became Proposition 5 in the 1978
election. 17 Proposition 5 was placed on the ballot by the Legislature
in response to the California Supreme Court's decision in Southern
Pacific Transportation v. Public Utilities Commission, which held
that the Public Utilities Commission had the power to declare a state
statute unconstitutional. 18 In his concurring and dissenting opinion in
this case, Justice Mosk vehemently argued that neither the
commission, nor any other administrative agency for that matter, had
the authority to declare a statute unconstitutional.' 9
An administrative agency, including an administrative agency
created by the Constitution or an initiative statute, has no power:
(a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a
statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an
appellate court has made a determination that such statute is
unconstitutional; (b) To declare a statute unconstitutional; (c) To
declare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute
on the basis that federal law or federal regulations prohibit the
enforcement of such statute unless an appellate court has made a
determination that the enforcement of such statute is prohibited
by federal law or federal regulations.
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5.
17. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 474.
18. Id. at 476. (citing S. Pac. Transp. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 556 P.2d 289
(Cal. 1976)). In South Pacific Transportation, the plaintiff sought review of a
decision of the defendant, in which the defendant found that a particular statute of
the Public Utilities Code was unconstitutional. 556 P.2d 290-91. The statute at
issue, Public Utilities Code section 1202.3, stated that:
[I~n any proceeding under section 1202 involving a Publicly used
road or highway not on a publicly maintained road system, the
commission may apportion costs of improvement to the public
entity if the commission finds (a) express dedication and
acceptance of the road or (b) a judicial determination of implied
dedication. If neither condition is found, the commission shall
order the crossing abolished by physical closing.
S. Pac. Transp., 556 P.2d at 291-92.
The defendant concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because it
"unconstitutionally delegates the state's police power to private litigants." Id. at
292. The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Public Utilities
Commission's findings and declared that the statute was not unconstitutional
because it merely gave private litigants the opportunity to bring the commission's
attention to a particular need or to instigate action by the commission. Id. at 292-
93.
19. S. Pac. Transp., 556 P.2d at 293 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Mosk argued that the commission's exercise of judicial power in this case
Justice Mosk also acknowledged an earlier case, Walker v.
Munro, in which the California Court of Appeals held that an
administrative agency that has been granted judicial or quasi-judicial
power by the California constitution has the authority to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. 20 The justice argued, however, that this
was in direct conflict with the separation of powers doctrine expressed in article III,
section 3 of the California Constitution. Id. at 295. He maintained that there was
neither an express authorization of such judicial power nor an inference of such
power from constitutional or legislative authorizations. Id. Justice Mosk stated:
A commissioner faithfully upholds the Constitution by
complying with the mandates of the Legislature, leaving to courts
the decision whether those mandates are invalid. The oath of
office to obey the Constitution requires obedience to the
Constitution not as self-indulgently defined by the commission,
but as interpreted by objective judicial tribunals.
Id. (citing Barr v. Watts, 70 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 1953)).
The justice concluded that "laws passed by a legislature represent the will of the
people," and thus these statutes are presumed to be constitutional "until clearly
proven otherwise." Id. at 296.
20. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 478 (citing S. Pac. Transp., 556 P.2d 293-94). In
Walker, the plaintiff liquor dealers had been charged in an administrative
proceeding with violating the fair trade provisions of the California Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act. Walker v. Munro, 2 Cal. Rptr. 737, 739 (Cal. Ct. App.
1960). While the proceeding was pending, the plaintiffs filed for declaratory
judgment in superior court to obtain a judgment that the act was unconstitutional
and to enjoin the defendant officials from enforcing the act. Id. The trial court,
relying on the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, ruled in favor of the officials. Id. at
741. On appeal, the liquor dealers argued that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
was inapplicable because the officials did not have the authority to decide
constitutional questions. Id. at 741. The court rejected this notion and found that
the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Board were "constitutional agencies upon which limited judicial powers
have been conferred." Id. The court held that:
The Appeals Board is empowered in appeals from decisions of
the department to review the questions "whether the department
has proceeded without or in excess of its jurisdiction, whether the
department has proceeded in the manner required by law,
whether the decision is supported by the findings, and whether
the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of
the whole record."
Id. at 73 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22).
Thus, because the administrative agency had been granted authority by the
California Constitution to exercise limited judicial power, the court concluded that
the agency in this case had the authority to determine the constitutionality of the
statute in question. Walker, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42.
Spring 2005 Lockver v. City and County of San Francisco
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decision had been "indirectly criticized and implicitly disapproved"
in State of California v. Superior Court, which held that the plaintiff
seeking a declaration that a particular statute was unconstitutional
was not required to pursue its constitutional claim before the
administrative agency prior to bringing a court action.21
While these two cases that Justice Mosk discussed may seem
fundamentally in conflict with one another, given that they resulted
in opposite outcomes, their facts make them distinguishable, and
therefore the reasoning behind these decisions is consistent.22 Most
importantly, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board in
Walker, unlike the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission in State
of California, had been granted quasi-judicial power by the
California constitution. 23 Because of this grant of judicial power, the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board was authorized to make
determinations as to the constitutionality of particular statutes,
whereas the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission was denied this
authority. 24  Thus, the decisions reached in Walker and State of
California were not inconsistent with one another.2 5
21. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 461 (citing S. Pac. Transp., 556 P.2d at 293). In State
of California v. Superior Court, the plaintiff sought a declaration in court that the
California Coastal Zone Conservation Act was unconstitutional. 524 P.2d 1281,
1289-90 (1974). The plaintiff sought this declaration without first exhausting its
administrative remedies by bringing the issue before the Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission. However, in this case, the California Supreme Court
held that the administrative remedies need not be exhausted since:
an administrative agency is not the appropriate forum in which to
challenge the constitutionality of the basic statute under which it
operates, there seems little reason to require a litigant to raise the
constitutional issue in proceedings before the agency as a
condition of raising that issue in the courts.
Id. at 1290.
Thus, because the administrative agency had not been granted authority by the
California Constitution to exercise any kind of judicial power, the court concluded
that the plaintiff in this case was not required to pursue a constitutional claim
before the commission prior to seeking a court action. Id. The commission did not
have the authority to determine questions of constitutionality. See id.
22. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 480.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
B. Case History
On February 10, 2004, Gavin Newsom, the newly elected mayor
of the city and county of San Francisco, sent a letter to the county
clerk requesting that she determine what changes would need to be
made to marriage license forms in order to provide marriage licenses
without regard to sexual orientation. 26 In response to this letter, the
county clerk designed a "gender-neutral" application for marriage
licenses and a "gender-neutral" marriage license to be used by same-
sex couples. 27 Two days later, the county clerk, using the altered
forms, began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and by
March, approximately 4,000 same-sex marriages were performed
under these licenses.2 8 On February 13, 2004, two separate actions
were filed in the San Francisco County Superior Court seeking to halt
the issuing of these licenses to same-sex couples; in each case, a
request for an immediate stay of the city's actions were denied.29 On
February 27, 2004, the Attorney General filed in the Supreme Court
of California for an original writ of mandate, prohibition, certiorari,
and/or other relief, and a request for an immediate stay.
30
III. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Majority
Justice George delivered the majority opinion. 31 He began his
discussion by noting that the issue in this case could arise in various
factual scenarios. 32 Justice George explained that, while at first
26. Id. at 464.
27. Id. at 465. The new form eliminated the terms "bride," "groom,"
"unmarried man," and "unmarried woman" and replaced them with "first
applicant," "second applicant," and "unmarried individuals." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 465-66.
30. Id. The petition requested the following: (1) directions to the local officials
to comply with the applicable statutes in issuing marriage license, (2) a declaration
that the same-sex marriage licenses that had been issued were invalid, and (3)
directions to the city to refund any fees collected in connection with such licenses
and certificates. Id.
31. Id. at 462.
32. Id. Justice George argued that this issue would arise, for example, if a local
Spring 2005 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco
374 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
glance this case may seem to present the substantive issue of the
rights of homosexuals, in fact, this case addressed a much broader
question of the authority of local officials in the execution of state
statutes. 33 In order to address such an issue, the Justice posited that
the fundamental question of "the role of the rule of law in a society
that justly prides itself on being 'a government of laws, and not of
men"' must be determined.34
In determining this question, Justice George acknowledged the
separation of powers doctrine as the classic understanding of the
local official's relationship with the other branches of government.35
He noted that the doctrine states that the legislative branch has the
authority to enact statutes, the executive branch has the authority to
enforce statutes, and the judicial branch has the authority to interpret
statutes. 36 While executive officials may take into consideration the
constitutionality of a particular statute within the scope of their
duties, they are not entitled to disregard a statute that imposes a
ministerial duty on them, merely because they believe the statute is
unconstitutional.37
With regard to the separation of powers doctrine, the court
declared that the Legislature determines all aspects relating to
marriage in California.38  Specifically, California Family Code
sections 300 through 310 set forth the components of a valid
official refused to enforce a statute that restricted the possession of handguns
because of his view that it violated the Second Amendment, or if a local official
refused to enforce a statute that imposed environmental restrictions on a property
owner's ability to obtain a permit because of his belief that the limitations
constituted an uncompensated "taking" of property in violation of the just
compensation clause. Id. at 462-63.
33. Id. at 463.
34. Id. at 463 n.l (quoting Adams, Nonvangulus Papers, No. 7 (1774),
reprinted in 4 Works of John Adams (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1851)).
35. Id. at 463.
36. Id.
37. Lockyer, 96 P.3d at 463-64 (stating that when "a duly enacted statute
imposes a ministerial duty upon an executive official to follow the dictates of the
statute in performing a mandated act, the official generally has no authority to
disregard the statutory mandate based on the official's own determination that the
statute is unconstitutional").
38. Id. at 467 (citing McClure v. Donovan, 205 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1949) and
Beeler v. Beeler, 124 Cal. App. 2d 679, 682 (1954)).
marriage. 39 As to the validity of marriage, section 300 clearly states
that marriages performed in California are to be limited to marriages
between a man and a woman.40 Moreover, section 308.5 provides
that only a marriage between a man and a woman is to be recognized
in California. 41 As to who is charged with the execution of the
various statutes related to marriage, section 102180 of the Health and
Safety Code states that the State Registrar has supervisory power
over local registrars in ensuring uniform compliance.42
Thus, in light of the issues brought forth in this case, the court
thought it prudent to provide a discussion of the roles of state and
local officials with regard to their duties in the issuing of marriage
licenses and certificates.43 Based on legislative history, as well as the
statutes' emphasis on the importance of procedural uniformity, the
court surmised that "marriage is a matter of 'statewide concern'
rather than a 'municipal affair."' 44 Justice George also noted that the
statutes indicate that only the county recorder and county clerk have
been granted authority by the state to issue marriage licenses and
certificates.4 5 With regard to the authority of a mayor, the statutes
reveal that he or she has no power to change or expand the duties of
the county clerks or recorders in the granting of marriage licenses.46
Thus, if a mayor were to instruct a county clerk or recorder as to the
issuing of marriage licenses, the court concluded that this would be in
excess of his or her granted authority.47
39. Id. at 468.
40. Id. (quoting Cal. Fain. Code § 300)). "Marriage is a personal relation
arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of
the parties capable of making that contract is necessary." Cal. Fam. Code § 300
(West 2004).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 470. The Health and Safety Code also provides that '-[t]he forms for
the application for license to marry, the certificate of registry of marriage including
the license to marry, and the marriage certificate shall be prescribed by the State
Registrar."' Id. (quoting Cal. Health & Safety Code § 103125).
43. Id. at 471.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court noted that a mayor may have the authority to supervise a
county clerk or county recorder in other areas of their employment, however this
authority does not extend to the area of granting marriage licenses. Id.
47. Id.
Lockyer v. City and County of San FranciscoSpring 2005
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The court next addressed the question of whether a public official
who deems a particular statute to be unconstitutional may refuse to
enforce that statute on the basis of this belief.48 Justice George began
this discussion by establishing that the duties of the county clerk and
county recorder are ministerial in the sense that once the statutory
requirements for marriage have been established, these officials have
no discretion in refraining to issue marriage licenses.49
Consequently, when the statutory requirements have not been met,
these local officials likewise do not have the discretion to
nevertheless issue marriage licenses. 50 Given these established rules,
the court declared that "a local public official, charged with the
ministerial duty of enforcing a statute, generally does not have the
authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of
unconstitutionality, to refuse to enforce the statute on the basis of the
official's view that it is unconstitutional." 51
The court elaborated on its decision first by acknowledging
article III, section 3.5 of the California constitution, which was cited
by petitioner in his argument that the actions of the local officials
were improper. 52 The Justice reasoned that, while section 3.5 was
instructive in this case, the court did not have to determine whether
the case fell within this article.53  Given that California law had
previously established that a local official with ministerial duties
does not have the power to refrain from enforcing a statute based on
his belief of the statute's unconstitutionality, the court concluded that
the city officials' actions in this case were ultimately invalid. 54
The court noted that there existed legal principles prior to the
inception of article RI, section 3.5 that created a foundation for both
the article and the court's holding in this case. One such principle is
48. Id.
49. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 473. The court defined a "ministerial act" as "'an act
that a public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion
concerning such act's propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists."'
Id. (quoting Kavanaugh v. W. Sonoma County High School Dist., 62 P.3d 54, 56
(Cal. 2003)).
50. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 473.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 475.
54. Id.
that a statute is presumed to be constitutional once it has been
enacted.55  Thus, a challenging party must clearly show
unconstitutionality, and any questions will be resolved in favor of a
statute's validity. 56  Furthermore, the court acknowledged another
principle that establishes that a public official's scope of authority is
defined by the governing statute from which the authority is
derived 5
7
While Justice George maintained that the court need not
determine the scope of article III, section 3.5, he reasoned that a
review of the historical background that ultimately resulted in the
adoption of this article would prove helpful in the analysis.5 8  He
noted that the article was placed on the ballot by the Legislature after
the California Supreme Court's ruling in Southern Pacific.5 9  As
previously discussed, the court held in this case that the Public
Utilities Commission had the authority to declare a statute
unconstitutional.6 ° Justice George also addressed Justice Mosk's
concurring and dissenting opinion, in which he strongly disagreed
with the majority and argued that no administrative agency could
declare a statute unconstitutional because it was the executive
branch's duty to merely implement and enforce statutes. 6' The
majority noted Justice Mosk's discussion of Walker, which
established that "an administrative agency that has been granted
judicial or quasi-judicial power by the California Constitution... has
the authority to consider the constitutionality of a statute in the
course of its quasi-judicial proceedings." 62  The court also
acknowledged Justice Mosk's conclusion that, although many powers
55. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 475.
56. Id. (citing 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988)).
57. Id. at 476. "It is well settled in this state and elsewhere, that when a statute
prescribes the particular method in which a public officer, acting under a special
authority, shall perform his duties, the mode is the measure of power." Id. (quoting
Cowell v. Martin, 43 Cal. 605, 613-14 (1872)).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing S. Pac. Transp., 556 P.2d 289).
60. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 476.
61. Id. at 477. Justice Mosk stated that "it is incongruous for the will of the
people of the state, reflected by their elected legislators, to be thwarted by a
governmental body which exists only to implement that will." Id. (quoting S. Pac.
Transp., 556 P.2d at 293).
62. Id. at 478.
Spring 2005 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco
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had been granted to the Public Utilities Commission, none of these
powers included the right to declare a statute unconstitutional.63
Based on these two seemingly conflicting views, the court in this
case concluded that administrative agencies that have been granted
judicial or quasi-judicial power by the California constitution have
the authority to review the constitutionality of statutes; however,
those agencies that have not been granted this authority cannot make
such determinations. 64  Given this historical background, Justice
George maintained that, even prior to the existence article III, section
3.5, the law had established that a local official had no power to
declare a statute unconstitutional if his or her duties. were purely
ministerial.
With the adoption of article III, section 3.5, the holding in
Southern Pacific was overruled, and Justice Mosk's argument that an
administrative agency had no power to withhold its enforcement of a
statute on the basis of unconstitutionality unless an appellate court
had made such a decision, was validated.66
While Justice George emphasized that the general rule was that
public officials were to comply with statutes, regardless of whether
or not they believed them to be constitutional, he noted that there
existed an exception to this rule in situations where "a public
official's refusal to apply the statute would provide the most practical
or reasonable means of enabling the question of the statute's
constitutionality to be brought before a court." 67 While the Justice
acknowledged that this might be a viable option in some scenarios,
he insisted that this case was not one of these situations, given that
there already existed a viable means of ensuring judicial review of
the constitutionality of the marriage statutes.68 He declared that if the
local officials believed that the marriage statutes were
unconstitutional, they could have denied a same-sex couple's
63. Id.
64. Id. at 480.
65. Id. The court noted as well that it was unaware of any California case that
indicated that a public official was granted judicial or quasi-judicial authority by
the California Constitution. Id.
66. Lockyer. 95 P.3d at 481.
67. Id. at 484 (citing Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of
"Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 865, 994-96 (1994)).
68. Id. at 485.
application for marriage and suggested that the couple challenge the
decision in court.6 9 This procedure had been used in California to
challenge the state's antimiscegenation statute, as well as in other
states to challenge opposite-sex marriage statutes. 70  Given that an
option existed that did not require local officials to disregard a state
statute, the court concluded that the above exception to the general
rule did not apply in this case.71
The court also acknowledged, and later rejected, an additional
exception to the general rule in which "it would be absurd or
unreasonable to require a public official to comply with a statute that
any reasonable official would conclude is unconstitutional., 72 Citing
the various decisions and opinions that have arisen from out-of-state
cases concerning the constitutionality of opposite-sex marriage
statutes, the court concluded that this case did not constitute a
situation where no reasonable official would believe the California
marriage statute was enforceable. 73 Thus, the court concluded that
"the city officials had no authority to refuse to perform their
ministerial duty in conformity with the current California marriage
statutes on the basis of their view that the statutory limitation of
marriage to a couple comprised of a man and a woman is
unconstitutional. 74
Justice George further rationalized the court's conclusion by
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948); Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)).
71. Id.
72. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 488.
73. Id. at 488-89.
74. Id. at 490. As support for its conclusion, the court cited State v. Heard, an
out-of-state case that held:
Executive officers of the State government have no authority to
decline the performance of purely ministerial duties which are
imposed upon them by a law, on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution. Laws are presumed to be, and must be treated
and acted upon by subordinate executive functionaries as
constitutional and legal, until their unconstitutionality or
illegality has been judicially established, for, in all well regulated
government, obedience to its laws by executive officers is
absolutely essential, and of paramount importance.
Id. at 490 (quoting State v. Heard, 18 So. 746, 749-52 (La. 1895)).
Spring 2005 Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco
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citing the practical consequences of the city's argument.75  He
posited that most executive officials lack the necessary legal training
to make viable constitutional determinations. 76  Furthermore, he
maintained that a local official has no authority to submit others to
his personal views by refusing to implement his ministerial duties.77
Even if the official did have such authority, the individuals affected
by his actions would be denied procedural safeguards, including an
opportunity to be heard.78 Justice George also emphasized that, were
each official in the state authorized to determine whether or not to
carry out a ministerial duty, there would be no uniformity as to
enforcement of state statutes, which would cause confusion among
the public. 79 This confusion would continue because, according to
the city's proposed rule, a court could not order compliance with a
statute until it had ruled on the constitutionality of that statute.
80
The court next addressed the city's argument that the federal
supremacy clause granted a local official authority to refuse to
enforce a state statute. 81 The city cited Ex Parte Young and LSO, Ltd.
v. Stroh as the basis for its position.82 The court distinguished these
cases from the present set of facts on the ground that these cases
stood for the proposition that an official acting in compliance with a
statute is not precluded from injunction or monetary judgment if a
court later determines the statute to be unconstitutional.83 Justice
George in fact determined that the Supreme Court had contradicted
75. Id.
76. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 490.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 491.
79. Id. Justice George commented:
If each official were empowered to decide whether or not to carry
out each ministerial act based upon the official's own personal
judgment of the constitutionality of an underlying statute, the
enforcement of statutes would become haphazard, leading to
confusion and chaos and thwarting the uniform statewide
treatment that state statutes generally are intended to provide.
Id.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000)).
83. Id.
the city's contention in its declaration that the "proper role of federal
executive officials with regard to constitutional determinations is
instructive." 84 In Smith v. Indiana, the Supreme Court stated that
"'there are many authorities to the effect that a ministerial officer,
charged by law with the duty of enforcing a certain statute, cannot
refuse to perform his plain duty thereunder upon the ground that in
his opinion it is repugnant to the Constitution."' 85 Thus, the court
concluded that its holding did not conflict with any federal
requirement. 8
6
Lastly, the court addressed the scope of relief that was to be
ordered.87 The court determined that it was appropriate to order the
officials not only to comply with the statutes in the future but also to
correct their past actions by notifying all of the affected individuals
of the invalidity of their marriages. 88 Thus, all same-sex marriages
authorized by the city officials were to be considered "void and of no
legal effect from their inception." 89 The court noted that, because the
validity of same-sex marriage was a question of law, individuals who
were not formal parties to this case were in no different a position
than if this question had been presented in a case involving another
same-sex couple. 90 The justice maintained that all interested parties
had had notice and opportunity to be heard. 91 Though the city urged
the court to postpone its ruling until the validity of same-sex
marriages had been determined, Justice George rejected this request
on the ground that it would be imprudent to keep these marriages "in
84. Id. at 492-93.
85. Id. at 493. (quoting Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138, 148 (1903) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court held that the power of a local official to question the
constitutionality of a statute is a state question rather than a federal question,
which, the justice contended, refuted the city's argument that an executive officer
could refuse to comply with a statute whenever he believed it violated the federal
Constitution. Id. at 493-94.
86. Id. at 494.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 495.
91. Id. The court stated that, while interested individuals may not have had the
opportunity to intervene in the present proceeding, its orders denying intervention
were without prejudice as to amicus curiae participation. Id.
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limbo" until such a determination was made.92  Thus, the court
instructed the county clerk and county recorder to take the following
corrective actions:
(1) identify all same-sex couples to whom the officials
issued marriage licenses, solemnized marriage
ceremonies, or registered marriage certificates, (2)
notify these couples that this court has determined that
same-sex marriages that have been performed in
California are void from their inception and a legal
nullity, and that these officials have been directed to
correct their records to reflect the invalidity of these
marriage licenses and marriages, (3) provide these
couples an opportunity to demonstrate that their
marriages are not same-sex marriages and thus that the
official records of their marriage licenses and
marriages should not be revised, (4) offer to refund,
upon request, all marriage-related fees paid by or on
behalf of same-sex couples, and (5) make appropriate
corrections to all relevant records. 93
The court concluded with its holding that "an executive official
who is charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute
generally has an obligation to execute that duty in the absence of a
judicial determination that the statute is unconstitutional, regardless
of the official's personal view of the constitutionality of the
statute."
94
1. Justice Moreno's Concurrence
Justice Moreno authored a concurring opinion.95 He noted that,
while the majority opinion primarily discussed the limitations on
local executive officials in disobeying statutes that have not yet been
judicially determined to be unconstitutional, what had not been
92. Id.
93. Id. at 495-96.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 499 (Moreno, J., concurring). Justice Moreno was joined in his
concurrence by Justices Baxter, Chin, and Brown.
addressed was what courts should do when faced with local executive
disobedience. 96 Though courts in many cases invariably decide the
constitutional question underlying a local official's refusal to obey a
particular statute, the court in this case refused to determine the
constitutional validity of Family Code Section 300. 9' Rather, the
majority held that a writ of mandate against the local officials was
appropriate because they had exceeded their ministerial duties.
98
Justice Moreno agreed with the majority that, under these
circumstances, the issuance of a writ of mandate prior to the
adjudication of the underlying constitutional question was
appropriate, however, he acknowledged that the court had discretion
to refrain from issuing the writ until the issue of constitutionality had
been determined. 99 Thus, the justice's separate opinion was designed
to address how courts should exercise their discretion when faced
with a similar case. 100
Justice Moreno first observed that most California courts, when
faced with a local official who refuses to observe a particular statute,
have determined the constitutional issue before deciding whether a
writ of mandate should be issued.' 0' This is based on the fact that
local officials will sometimes preliminarily determine that a statute is
96. Id.
97. Id. at 500.
98. Id. Justice Moreno outlined the requirements for obtaining a writ of
mandate as: "'(1) [a] clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the
respondent .... ; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the
performance of that duty .... '" Id. (quoting Santa Clara County Counsel Attys.
Assn. v. Woodside, 7 Cal. 4th 525, 539-40 (1994)). The Justice also noted that
"'the lack of any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the usual course of law..
'" is also required. Id. (quoting Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Ross, 61 Cal. 2d 199,
203 (1964)).
99. Id. Justice Moreno stated: "when a court is asked to grant a writ of
mandate to enforce a statute over which hangs a substantial cloud of
unconstitutionality, the above-stated principles dictate that a court at least has the
discretion to refuse to issue the writ until the underlying constitutional question has
been decided." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 4th 278 (2003);
Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 3d 1 (1986); Zee Toys, Inc.
v. County of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d, 763 (1978); Paso Robles Hosp. Dist. v.
Negley, 29 Cal. 2d 203 (1946); Denman v. Broderick, 111 Cal. 96 (1896); City of
Oakland v. Digre, 205 Cal. App. 3d 99 (1988); Bayside Timber Co. v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1971)).
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unconstitutional so as to bring the constitutional challenge to the
courts. 10 2 This practice is known as the exercise of an "executive
function."' 0
3
The justice concluded that there are at least three situations in
which a local official's refusal to comply with a statute would be
reasonable; and therefore, courts asked to grant a writ of mandate
should first resolve the underlying constitutional issue.10 4 The first of
these situations involves cases where the statute in question violates a
"'clearly established . . . constitutional right."' 105  In this scenario,
the refusal to comply with an unconstitutional statute would not
violate the separation of powers because "refusing to enforce clearly
unconstitutional statutes saves the resources of both the executive
and the judiciary."'"06 The second situation of reasonable executive
disobedience that Justice Moreno addressed would be situations in
which there is a substantial question as to the statute's
constitutionality, and the statute is related to the locality's self-
governance.10 7 In this scenario, the local official is directly affected
by the statute in question and therefore has standing to challenge it.
10 8
The third situation is one in which there is a question as to the
statute's constitutionality, and irreparable harm may result to
individuals whom the local executive has some obligation to
protect. 10 9 In this scenario, while a court would have the discretion to
102. Id. at 501.
103. Id. Justice Moreno emphasized that the exercise of executive function is
not to upset the separation of powers but rather it is to "raise constitutional issues
for the courts to ultimately decide." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. An example of such a situation would be when a local official decides
not to spend resources to adhere to an obviously unconstitutional statute. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Justice Moreno gave several examples of this second category of
executive disobedience, such as officials challenging statutes to determine the
validity of a bond, an exemption to a local tax that violates the commerce clause,
the payment of a government salary for employment that was unconstitutionally
created, or a statute that affects city or county employee compensation. Id. In
these cases, the local officials' refusal to comply with the statutes in question
merely preserves the status quo, which has a very minimal effect on the judiciary's
authority. Id.
109. Id. at 501-02. Examples of individuals whom the local executive has an
obligation to protect are: residents of the city, employees, patients in a public
issue the writ without first deciding the underlying constitutional
issue, enforcing a potentially unconstitutional statute could "work
irreparable harm, [and] would not 'promot[e] the ends of justice."', 10
Justice Moreno argued that this case did not fall into any of the
above three categories.' 1' First, it was not clear whether Family
Code section 300 was unconstitutional." 2  Second, the statute in
question did not interfere with the city's self-governance because the
local officials in this case had a ministerial duty to adhere to the state
marriage law.' 13 Lastly, this case did not fit into the third category
because the only harm caused by the enforcement of the statute was
the delay in homosexual couples being married while the
constitutional issue was being determined." 4  Consequently, the
justice concluded that "the city advances no plausible reason why it
had to disobey the statute in question" and agreed with the majority
that a writ of mandate should be issued against the local officials. 115
hospital, students of a public school, and patrons of a public library. Id. at 1124.
110. Id. at 502 (quoting McDaniel v. City of San Francisco, 259 Cal. App. 2d
356, 360-61 (1968)).
111. Id.
112. Id. Justice Moreno argued that the constitutionality of Family Code
section 300 had not been established by the language of the constitutional
provisions or state or federal precedent. Id.
113. Justice Moreno maintained that, unlike the examples cited above where
the constitutionality of a statute is likely to go unchallenged unless the official
challenges it, Family Code section 300 affects the rights of individuals, and
therefore, those affected individuals are in the best position to challenge the statute.
Id.
114. Id. The justice stated that this delay was likely to result regardless of
whether or not the writ of mandate was granted because the statute prohibited local
officials from granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Id. These officials
did have the authority to issue licenses of "indeterminate legal status," thus "[t]he
exercise of the court's mandate power to preclude local officials from continuing
this course of action, and voiding the licenses already issued, brings no irreparable
harm to the individuals who have received or might receive such licenses." Id.
115. Id. Justice Moreno conceded that it might have been appropriate to delay
the issuance of a writ until the constitutional question had been determined if the
mayor had issued a single "'test case' homosexual marriage license. Id.
However, because the local executive issued over 4,000 marriage licenses, Justice
Moreno concluded that "the city went well beyond making a preliminary
determination of the statute's unconstitutionality or performing an act that would
bring the constitutional issue to the courts." Id. By issuing so many marriage
licenses, the local officials not only acted against their ministerial duties, but they
violated the doctrine of separation of powers by deciding the constitutionality of
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C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Kennard's Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority opinion insofar as
the court concluded that the local officials exceeded their authority
by issuing same-sex marriage licenses. 1 6 However, she did not
agree that the 4,000 marriages that had been performed under these
licenses should be declared void.1 17  She argued instead that a
determination on these licenses should not be made until the
constitutional question had been resolved.' 1 8
Like Justice Moreno, Justice Kennard believed that there are a
few situations in which a local official may refuse to enforce a statute
based on constitutionality." 9 These situations include:
(1) when the statute's unconstitutionality is obvious
beyond dispute in light of unambiguous constitutional
language or controlling judicial decisions; (2) when
refraining from enforcement is necessary to preserve
the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm pending
judicial determination of a legitimate and substantial
constitutional question about the statute's validity; (3)
when enforcing the statute could put the public official
at risk for substantial personal liability; or (4) when
refraining from enforcement is the only practical
means to obtain a judicial determination of the
constitutional question. 120
As to the first scenario, Justice Kennard maintained that
California's marriage laws are not clearly unconstitutional. 121 On the
the statute without the authority to do so. Id.
116. Id. at 503 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Justice Kennard argued that neither the federal nor state Constitution
prohibits same-sex marriage or the limiting of marriage to opposite-sex couples.
Id.
contrary, the justice discussed Baker v. Nelson, a United States
Supreme Court case holding that a state law restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples was not unconstitutional. 122  She concluded
that:
[b]ecause neither the federal nor the California
Constitution contains any provision directly and
expressly guaranteeing a right to marry another person
of the same sex, and because no court has ever
decided that either Constitution confers that right, this
is not a situation in which a public official refused to
enforce a law that was obviously and indisputably
unconstitutional. 123
As to the second scenario, Justice Kennard argued that this was
not a situation where refraining from enforcing a statute would
preserve the status quo in order to prevent irreparable harm.12
4
Rather, the local officials were in fact altering the status quo by
issuing the marriage licenses against Family Code section 300.125
The justice concluded that this issuing of marriage licenses was not a
temporary action taken to prevent irreparable harm but rather was
intended to be a "permanent change in traditional marriage eligibility
requirements, based on [the officials'] own views about
122. Id. (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)). In this case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a state law restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples was not unconstitutional. Id. at 503 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310 (1971)). The court then dismissed the appeal "'for want of substantial federal
question."' Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 504 (citing Baker, 409 U.S. at 810). Justice
Kennard argued that a dismissal on the grounds of lack of a federal question
reaffirmed the lower court's decision and prevented "lower courts and public
officials from coming to the conclusion that a state law barring marriage between
persons of the same sex violates the equal protection or due process guarantees of
the United States Constitution." Id. at 504. Thus, the justice maintained that until
the Supreme Court rules otherwise, Baker is controlling as to the question of
whether a state may define marriage as between a man and a woman. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 504-05. Justice Kennard cited Family Code section 300 and Family
Code section 308.5 as support for the notion that California's status quo had been
opposite-sex marriage. Id. at 505. She also noted that California courts have only
recognized opposite-sex marriages. Id. (citing Mott v. Mott, 82 Cal. 413 (1890)).
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constitutional questions."'126 These actions, the justice argued, were
beyond the city officials' authority.'
27
As to the third scenario, Justice Kennard believed that "[t]his was
not a situation in which public officials had reason to fear they might
be held personally liable in damages for enforcing a constitutionally
invalid state law."' 28 The justice noted that a public official may not
be held personally liable in a civil rights action for enforcing a state
law that is later deemed to be unconstitutional "unless the 'contours
of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.""
29
Consequently, because the Supreme Court in Baker held that a state
law prohibiting same-sex marriage is not unconstitutional, Justice
Kennard argued that no reasonable public official would conclude
that refraining from issuing marriage licenses to homosexual couples
would be unconstitutional. 130 Therefore, no personal liability could
be imposed on the local officials who upheld the California statute.131
Justice Kennard also maintained that there was no basis for the local
officials to fear personal liability for not issuing same-sex marriage
licenses. 132
Finally, as to the fourth scenario, Justice Kennard held that the
mayor's refusal to enforce the statute in question was not the only
way to obtain a judicial determination as to the underlying question
of constitutionality. 133 Citing the cases that were used to challenge
California's prohibition against interracial marriage in the 1940s, the
justice maintained that the prohibition against same-sex marriage
126. Id. at 505.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
130. Id. at 505.
131. Id.
132. Id. Justice Kennard cited Government Code section 820.6, which
"provides immunity for public employees acting in good faith, without malice,
under a statute that proves to be unconstitutional." Id. Consequently, because
same-sex marriage has never been granted in California, the state courts have never
suggested that statutes that prohibit same-sex marriage are unconstitutional, and the
California constitution does not grant an express right to same sex marriage, Justice
Kennard maintained that Government Code section 820.6 would provide immunity
to any official for enforcing the opposite-sex marriage statute. Id. at 505-06.
133. Id. at 506.
could be challenged by a lawsuit brought by a homosexual couple
who had been denied a marriage license.' 34
Justice Kennard concluded her discussion of the general rule
prohibiting executive non-enforcement based on constitutional
grounds by noting the confusion and lack of conformity that would
result if all of the local officials in California's fifty-eight counties
could independently decide which rules would and would not be
enforced based on their reading of the Constitution.' 35 She stated
that:
To ensure uniformity and consistency in the statewide
application and enforcement of duly enacted and
presumptively valid statutes, the authority of public
officials to decline enforcement of state laws, in the
absence of a judicial determination of invalidity, based
on the officials' own constitutional determinations, is
and must be carefully and narrowly limited. 1
36
Thus, Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the San
Francisco officials exceeded their authority by issuing marriage
licenses to homosexual couples.' 37
Because the justice agreed that the local officials had exceeded
their authority, she concurred with the majority that the proper
judgment would be to require the officials to comply with the
marriage statutes, to notify the couples who had received the licenses
that they were invalid, to offer refunds for the license fees that were
collected, and to make corrections to the records.' 38 Nonetheless, she
did not agree that the marriages should be declared as void and a
legal nullity. 39  Justice Kennard advocated that until the
134. Id. (citing Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 711).
135. Lockyer, P.3d at 506.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 507.
139. Id. Justice Kennard argued that the determination of whether these 4,000
marriages were void should be detained until the constitutionality of the statute is
resolved. Id. She maintained that:
[i]f the restriction is constitutional, then a marriage between
persons of the same sex would be a legal impossibility, and no
marriage would ever have existed. But if the restriction violates
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constitutional issue of the marriage statutes has been resolved, it is
premature to declare these marriages invalid. 1
40
2. Justice Werdegar's Opinion
Like Justice Kennard, Justice Werdegar agreed with the majority
that the San Francisco officials violated the California marriage
statutes by issuing marriage licenses to homosexual couples. 141 The
justice also agreed that the officials should be ordered to comply with
the statutes until and unless they are determined to be
unconstitutional. 42 However, this was as far as the justice's opinion
concurred with the majority.
Justice Werdegar argued that the majority was incorrect in
declaring the 4,000 marriages performed as void. 143 Just as Justice
Kennard had argued, Justice Werdegar maintained that if the
California statutes were later determined to be unconstitutional, the
couples who had already received their marriage licenses would be
entitled to recognition of their marriage. 144 The justice also felt that
declaring these marriages void was unfair to the affected couples who
had not been joined as parties in the litigation or been given notice or
a fundamental constitutional right, the situation could be quite
different. A court might then be required to determine the
validity of same-sex marriages that had been performed before
the laws prohibiting those marriages had been invalidated on
constitutional grounds.
Id.
Thus, if the California marriage statute were later judicially determined to be
unconstitutional, the marriages that were issued unlawfully by the city officials
could be recognized retroactively as valid. Id.
140. Id. at 507-08. Justice Kennard maintained that "[s]hould the pending
lawsuits ultimately be resolved by a determination that the opposite-sex marriage
restriction is constitutionally invalid . . . it would then be the appropriate time to
address the validity of previously solemnized same-sex marriages." Id. at 508.
141. Id. (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The justice noted that interracial marriages that had previously been
void under anti-miscegeny statutes were later validated after the Supreme Court
declared those statutes to be unconstitutional. Id. (citing Dick v. Reaves, 434 P.2d
295, 298 (Okla. 1967)). Justice Werdegar advocated that the majority's declaration
of the marriages as void was a premature decision that did not represent a fair
judicial process. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 508.
opportunity to appear.' 
45
The justice further disagreed with the majority as to its comments
on the separation of powers and the relationship between the judicial
and executive branches. 146  Justice Werdegar stated that the
majority's characterization of the city officials' actions as "a threat to
the rule of law" was an exaggeration of the events that took place in
this case. 14 7 Additionally, the justice maintained that the majority's
declaration of power over the executive branch was not justified'1 48
She argued that a rule requiring a local executive official to seek the
court's permission before refraining from compliance with an
unconstitutional statute, defied the separation of powers doctrine.
149
145. Id. at 509. On March 12, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied all
petitions to intervene. Id. Thus, Justice Werdegar argued that "[t]o declare
marriages void after denying requests by the purported spouses to appear in court
as parties and be heard on the matter is hard to justify, to say the least." Id. The
justice further noted that none of the affected couples had been given notice, which
due process requires, and eleven homosexual couples who affirmatively sought to
intervene, were denied the opportunity to appear. Id. As the justice advocated, all
members of a class action have the right to notice and the opportunity to appear,
and therefore, the affected couples in this case should not have been denied this
same right. Id. Justice Werdegar stated:
[w]hat the majority has done, in effect, is to give petitioners the
benefit of an action against a defendant class of same-sex couples
free of the burden of procedural due process. If the majority truly
desired to hear the views of the same-sex couples whose rights it
is adjudicating, it would not proceed in absentia.
Id.
146. Id. at 510.
147. Id. Justice Werdegar noted that when the California Supreme Court issued
an interim order on March 11, 2004 for the officials to stop issuing the same-sex
marriage licenses, they fully complied. Id. After this order was issued, no other
California county or municipality granted a same-sex marriage license. Id.
148. Id. Justice Werdegar claimed that it was misguided of the majority to
assert that the executive must follow statutory laws unless and until the court tells it
otherwise. Id. The justice argued that "[t]o recognize that an executive officer has
the practical freedom to act based on an interpretation of the Constitution that may
ultimately prove to be wrong does not mean the rule of law has collapsed." Id. at
511. The justice maintained that as long as the judicial branch can hear legal
challenges to executive actions, enjoin such actions if deemed necessary, and
remain the final word in constitutional interpretation, there is no threat to the rule
of law. Id.
149. Id. The justice asserted that the executive branch is "active," while the
judicial branch is "reactive." Id. Thus, the executive branch, according to Justice
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Moreover, the justice disagreed with the majority's characterization
of "executive officers exercising 'ministerial' functions as statutory
automatons" who have no discretion in questioning the
constitutionality of a particular statute. 150 Justice Werdegar
concluded her opinion by asserting that, given the San Francisco
officials' compliance with the court's interim order in ceasing to
issue same-sex marriage licenses, the majority's speculation as to the
limits of the executive branch's authority was "unnecessary and
regrettable."''5 She stated:
[w]e, as a court, should not claim more power than we
need to do our job effectively. In particular, strong
claims of judicial power over the executive branch are
best left unmade and, if they must be made, are best
reserved for cases presenting a real threat to the
separation of powers - a threat that provides manifest
necessity for the claim, a genuine test of the claim's
validity, and a suitable incentive for caution in its
articulation. None of these conditions, all of which
are necessary to ensure sound decisions in hard cases,
is present here. 152
IV. IMPACT
The ramifications of the California Supreme Court's decision in
Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco have played a major
role in many of America's most recent political and social
Werdegar, should not have to "await the courts' pleasure." Id.
150. Id. Justice Werdegar pointed out that local officials were merely
performing their ministerial functions when they enforced state segregation laws
after Brown v. Board of Education had been passed. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The justice argued that the courts once believed
that executive officials' oaths to obey the Constitution "had sufficient gravity in
such cases to permit them to obey the higher law, even before the courts had
spoken state by state." Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 511. Justice Werdegar maintained that
the majority in this case had rejected this understanding of the executive branch
and instead had claimed that executive officials are to obey the mandates passed by
the legislature until the courts make a decision as to their constitutionality. Id.
151. Id. at 512.
152. Id.
controversies.1 53  While the court in Lockyer strongly emphasized
that its decision was not to be a ruling on the substantive issue of
same-sex marriage, 154 what erupted from this case, and the events
leading up to this litigation, was nothing short of a social
magnification of homosexual rights in America.' 55 At the time the
court's decision was released, the justices were well aware that the
constitutional issue of California's marriage statutes was making its
way up the judicial ladder.' 56 It would not be much longer until the
judicial branch would be faced with the question that this court had
so adamantly declared was meant for its evaluation, not that of the
executive officials who had made their own constitutional rulings. 57
The only question left after this case is what role, if any, the
executive branch plays in constitutional decision-making.
A. Administrative Impact
The most definitive administrative impact of Lockyer v. City and,
County of San Francisco is the power it has provided to the judiciary.
The final conclusion in this case is that the ultimate determination of
constitutionality is made by the courts.158 While this holding may
153. See Tom Musbach, Bush Backs FMA, Outrages Gay Citizens (Jan. 6,
2005), at http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2004/02/24/5 (describing how San
Francisco's gay weddings prompted President Bush to support the Federal
Marriage Act, an act that defines marriage as a union between a man and a
woman).
154. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 463. Justice George stated that:
although the present proceeding may be viewed by some as
presenting primarily a question of the substantive legal rights of
same-sex couples, in actuality the legal issue before us implicates
the interest of all individuals in ensuring that public officials
execute their official duties in a manner that respects the limits of
the authority granted to them as officeholders.
Id.
155. Peele, supra note 1, at A25 (detailing how many advocates for same-sex
marriage have compared this movement to the civil rights movement of the 1960s).
156. Lockyer, 95 95 P.3d at 507. Justice Kennard stated: "Recognizing the
difficulty and seriousness of the constitutional question, which is now presented in
pending superior court actions, this court has declined to address it in this case."
Id.
157. See Peele, supra note 1, at Al.
158. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 485. Justice George quoted Justice Mosk as stating
that a local executive official "'faithfully upholds the Constitution by complying
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seem to some as merely a reaffirmation of the separation of powers
doctrine, others might consider it to be a stripping of the executive
branch of any kind of constitutional authority it may have once
had. 159 As Justice Werdegar argued in her concurring and dissenting
opinion:
[I] see no justification for asserting a broad claim of
power over the executive branch. Make no mistake,
the majority does assert such a claim by holding that
executive officers must follow statutory rather than
constitutional law until a court gives them permission
in advance to do otherwise. For the judiciary to assert
such power over the executive branch is
fundamentally misguided.160
The holding in this case causes one to question whether the
executive branch is left with any kind of constitutional discretion.
While Justices Moreno and Kennard enumerated a few specific
situations in which public officials would be permitted to disobey a
statute based on constitutional grounds,' 61 these scenarios involve
fact patterns in which constitutionality is hardly even an issue or the
concerns of constitutionality are superseded by a greater concern.162
with the mandates of the Legislature, leaving to courts the decision whether those
mandates are invalid."' Id. (quoting S. Pac. Transp., 18 Cal. 3d at 319).
159. See Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 510-13.
160. Id. at 510.
161. See id. at 501-03 (stating that executive disobedience of a statute would
be permissible in cases in which the statute violates a clearly established
constitutional right; cases in which there is a substantial question as to the statute's
constitutionality and the statute governs matters integral to a locality's limited
power of self-governance; and cases in which the question of a statute's
constitutionality is substantial and irreparable harm may result to individuals to
which the local government has some protective obligation). See also id. at 503
(stating that executive disobedience of a statute would be permissible when the
statute's unconstitutionality is obvious in light of unambiguous constitutional
language or controlling judicial decisions; when refraining from enforcement is
necessary to preserve status quo and to prevent irreparable harm; when enforcing
the statute could put the public official at risk for substantial personal liability; and
when refraining from enforcement is the only practical means to obtain a judicial
determination of the constitutional question).
162. See id. at 501-03.
Thus, the only authority the executive seems to retain in regard to
constitutionality is essentially superficial and somewhat skewed. It is
interesting to consider whether this case would have been so one-
sided if the San Francisco officials' duties were not ministerial and
the executive were allowed a certain amount of discretion in its
decision-making.
While all of the justices agreed in this case that the San Francisco
officials had overstepped their bounds, the question still remains as to
how much leeway a local executive official retains after the holding
in this case. How can a mayor or governor carry out his or her duties
to uphold the Constitution if they must first seek the judiciary's
permission to act? Though the Lockyer court drew a line in the sand
as to where the executive branch's power stops, it failed to elaborate
as to the boundaries within which the executive branch has free reign
to make its decisions. Consequently, the question of constitutionality
remains, and the separation of powers remains in flux.
B. Social Impact
The social impact of Lockyer, and the events leading up to
litigation, is pervasive and far-reaching. Though the case did not
address the substantive issue of same-sex marriage, many outside the
courtroom felt that this holding would play a substantial role in the
future of homosexual political issues. One of those individuals
concerned with the outcome of the case was President George W.
Bush, who used a radio address in July 2003 to urge support for the
proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, an amendment that would
define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. 163 The
163. Kathy Kiely, Gay Issues on Ballot Add Twist to Election, USA Today,
Jul. 11, 2004, available at http:l/www.usatoday.cornnews/politicselections/nation
/president/2004-07- 11-cover-gay-marriage-electionx.htm. The proposed
amendment, which was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on May
21, 2003, stated:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution
of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require
that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.
Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (1st Sess.
2003).
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President, concerned with the same-sex weddings that had been
performed in San Francisco, felt that the only way to protect the
institution of marriage from "'activist judges"' would be to enshrine
it in "'the only law a court cannot overturn.' ' 164 It seems almost
ironic that the executive branch, which was essentially stripped of
most of its constitutional authority in Lockyer, would set out to assure
that the judiciary could not overrule its actions in this context - even
if those actions were to prevent the issuance of same-sex marriage
licenses.
Another ramification of this case was revealed in the 2004
election, where bans on homosexual marriage passed in all of the
eleven states that had placed the measure on their ballots. 65  And
while many argue that these initiatives did not necessarily launch
President Bush to a victory, 166 others felt that the notoriety of Mayor
Gavin Newsom and the same-sex marriage ceremonies, flashed
across the nightly news, encouraged conservative voters to rush to
the polls. 167  Consequently, even though the California Supreme
Court justices emphasized that the Lockyer case had nothing to do
with the underlying issue of same-sex marriage, the social upheaval
164. Id.
165. Charisse Jones, Issues: 11 States Nix Gay Marriage; Calif. OKs Stem-
Cell Work, USA Today, Nov. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.conmnews/politicselections/vote2004/initiative.htm. The
eleven states that banned same-sex marriage included the following: Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah. Id.
166. Id. USA Today reported that because 2004 was a particularly contentious
election year, "turnout would likely have been high with or without the proposed
amendments." Id.
167. Kiely, supra note 162. Before the election, USA Today predicted:
The conventional wisdom says that making an issue of gay
marriage will help President Bush's re-election. All the ballot
initiatives will be up for a vote on the same day as the
presidential election .... Democrats . . .fought to keep the
same-sex union question off the Nov. 2 ballot, a sign of their
concern about its impact.
Id. See also Lisa Leff, Split Won't Likely Tarnish S.F. Mayor's Image,
SAN RAMON VALLEY TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at A36. It was reported that
"[a]fter Republicans held onto the White House and gained power in
Congress in November, some prominent Democrats blamed the same-sex
marriage issue in general and Newsom in particular for giving social
conservatives a reason to vote." Id.
that the case created could be felt by many, both in and outside of the
courtroom.
At a more local level, the court's decision had a profound effect
on the homosexual individuals who had been formerly granted
marriage licenses in February.' 68  Beyond these particular
individuals, many more homosexual Americans felt that the state law
and the case holding, placed them in a "separate and inferior legal
status." 1 69 The right to marry seemed to be such a fundamental right
that many could not believe that they did not have the opportunity to
enjoy it as every other - heterosexual - American. These same-sex
couples argued that the legislature had made a conscious decision to
discriminate against gay individuals when it passed the state code
that defined marriage as between a man and a woman. 170  Thus,
though the decision in Lockyer was not meant to take a stance on the
gay rights issue, many who felt the negative impact by the case
perceived the decision as a clear indication of the judiciary's leanings
on the question of constitutionality.
C. Judicial Impact
Given that the California Supreme Court chose not to resolve the
underlying constitutional question of same-sex marriage in Lockyer,
this issue finally reached the San Francisco Superior Court on
December 22, 2004 - ten months after Mayor Newsom had begun
issuing the controversial marriage licenses.' 7' Judge Richard Kramer
began hearing arguments from a group of thirty different lawyers
who represented a group of consolidated cases that pitted the city
officials and twelve homosexual couples against the state of
California and socially conservative groups. 172 While the plaintiffs
argued that the current marriage statutes placed homosexual couples
in a separate and inferior class, the defendants argued that the
purpose of the statute was procreation, and therefore, the statute
should remain as written.' 73
168. Peele, supra note 1, at Al.
169. Id.
170. Id. at A25.
171. Id. at Al.
172. Id.
173. Id. Deputy Attorney General Louis Mauro, in defending the current
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Judge Kramer concluded that he had three options in this debate -
he could find that: (1) the statute is constitutional as it stands, giving
a victory to the state and the family campaign; (2) the statute is
unconstitutional as it stands, giving a victory to the city and the
homosexual couples; or (3) more hearings need to be conducted. 174
Noting that appeals were inevitable after his ruling, Judge Kramer
emphasized that he wanted to create a "clean case record for
appellate courts" because he realized that he was "only the first
stop."'175
Finally, on March 14, 2005, Judge Kramer ruled that the same-
sex marriage ban violated equal protection guaranteed by the state
constitution.1 76  Judge Kramer found unconvincing the argument
made by same-sex marriage opponents that marriage is meant to
further procreation, given that there are many married heterosexual
couples that choose not to have children, as well as many children
that are born out of wedlock. 177 He also rejected the argument that
the state's domestic partnership law adequately protected the rights
of homosexual couples. 178  Judge Kramer stated: "The idea that
marriagelike rights without marriage is adequate smacks of a concept
long rejected by the courts - separate but equal."'179 While Mayor
Newsom and homosexual partners were elated by the decision, San
Francisco executive officials will not likely be able to issue same-sex
marriage licenses until all of the court appeals are finalized - a
process that could take more than one year to resolve. 80
statute, urged Judge Kramer "to uphold existing law and allow the Legislature, not
the judiciary, to make 'complex social policy."' Id.
174. Thomas Peele, Same-Sex Marriage Debate Focuses on Children, SAN
RAMON VALLEY TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2004, at A4.
175. Id. Judge Kramer has until mid-April of 2005 to reach a ruling. Id.
176. Matt Krupnick, Gay Couples Get One Step Nearer Altar, SAN RAMON
VALLEY TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at Al. The judge concluded that: "The state's
protracted denial of equal protection cannot be justified simply because such
constitutional violation has become traditional. Simply put, same-sex marriage
cannot be prohibited solely because California has always done so before." Id.
177. Id. at A25.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Mayor Newsom stated at a press conference that "rt]his is an
important day, but it is far from complete. I look forward to the day when we look
back and say 'Why was this such a big deal?' Id.
The situation that has arisen in these debates is illustrative of the
impact that Lockyer has had on the judicial arena. As the California
Supreme Court had encouraged, homosexual couples, the undeniably
affected parties, are taking their cases to the judiciary to have this
constitutional issue resolved once and for all. Though the proverbial
ball is rolling, it will be quite some time before a final resolution is
reached. Until then, San Francisco officials must refrain from issuing
any more gender-neutral marriage licenses, and homosexual
individuals must hold their breath for a final ruling.
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Lockyer came at a
time when America was concerned with much more than the
separation of powers. While the justices did their best to emphasize
that this type of case could appear in any type of situation, not just
one surrounding gay marriage, many perceived this decision as a
defining moment in the nation's stance on same-sex marriage.
Unfortunately, what was missed in all of the media sensationalism
and political double-talk, was the fact that this decision affected how
local executive officials could conduct their duties.
While the majority and the other concurring and dissenting
opinions raised extremely valid issues and arguments for their
stances on the separation of powers, ultimately the majority's more
structured view of the doctrine prevailed. The court determined that
a local official who has been granted merely ministerial duties has
neither the authority nor discretion to determine the constitutionality
of a statute. 18 1 And while certain exceptions may exist where an
official would have the discretion to make particular decisions, given
the definition of state marriage statutes, as well as the fact that other
options are available to the officials if they perceive the statutes to be
unconstitutional, this was not such a situation. 82
181. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 471. The court held that "a local public official,
charged with the ministerial duty of enforcing a statute, generally does not have the
authority, in the absence of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, to refuse
to enforce the statute on the basis of the official's view that it is unconstitutional."
Id. at 473.
182. Id. at 485. The majority stated that "the city officials had no authority to
refuse to perform their ministerial duty in conformity with the current California
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Given that the majority refused to address the underlying
question of constitutionality involved in this case, however, the
parties are once again seeking to gain some answers as to what kind
of marriage is legally and constitutionally recognized in the state of
California. It would not be surprising to find these justices once
again faced with the question that they refrained from answering in
its first appearance. The justices' decisions and arguments laid out in
Lockyer could very well affect how the question addressing the
constitutionality of the marriage statutes are handled in future cases.
marriage statutes on the basis of their view that the statutory limitation of marriage
to a couple comprised of a man and a woman is unconstitutional." Id. at 488.
